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The article is divided into four sections. I shall begin with a short outline of indigenous entrepreneurship in the Dutch colonial economy. This will be followed by a short description of Japan's economic advance into prewar Indonesia. After that I would like to discuss why and how Japanese and indigenous business groups found each other, a phenomenon which began in the late twenties, and what effects this had on the position of pribumi businesses in pre-war Indonesia. Finally, I shall look at the developments in this field during the Japanese occupation. Throughout the third and fourth sections, the business fortunes of Agoes Moesin Dasaad, the foremost indigenous entrepreneur during the period under study, will form the thread which binds the two together.
Indigenous entrepreneurship and the Dutch colonial economy
The Dutch colonial economy in Java is generally depicted as an ethnically stratified economy. The Dutch dominated the capital-intensive top layer. The Javanese provided the labour and made a living by subsistence farming, petty trading, and handicraft production. The Chinese (and to a lesser extent Arabs and Indians) occupied the intermediate layer, linking the other two groups together. Recent scholarship has modified this rather static picture, particularly in regard to the alleged lack of a 'capitalist spirit' among the Javanese and the monetization of the rural economy.
By the early nineteenth century the Javanese economy had expanded greatly, resulting in a growing population, increasing cash-crop production and non-farming activities, and integrated indigenous trading networks through which locally produced and manufactured goods were distributed far beyond the boundaries of the locality (Alexander, Boomgaard and White 1991:1-13) . This was to change. During the remainder of the century colonial rule fixed the boundaries of this expanding economy and the Javanese were forced into market relationships in which outsiders (for example Dutch and Chinese) set the prices. This strangulation continued into the early twentieth century, when the Dutch decided upon what they termed an ethical policy and the forcible expansion of the colonial state. Even so, Javanese merchants were able to find their niche. Indigenous traders from Kudus, batik merchants from Yogyakarta and Surakarta, and the kalang (wealthy merchants) from Kota Gede, who travelled widely in Banyumas and Kedu, were among the best-known trading minorities in Java. In an instructive essay, Christine Dobbin highlights the economic performance of yet another indigenous business group in Java, the Baweanese. These Muslim traders, from a tiny island north of Gresik (East Java), operated successful enterprises throughout the whole of East Java, even as far as Batavia and Semarang, until the late twenties. Their principal item of trade was cloth and they had direct dealings with European business houses in the three main ports of Java (Dobbin 1991:119) .
Despite the fact that these indigenous merchant groups in Java were doing well and ran enterprises of which the significance was largely either ignored or underestimated by contemporary Dutch officials, they somehow failed to mature into major capitalist business groups. Two general viewpoints, one stressing cultural inhibitions and one stressing institutional restraints, have been adduced to explain this phenomenon. 3 Recently Jennifer and Paul Alexander (1991a) have put forward the thesis that the political economy of the Dutch colonial state in Java and the economic ideology of Dutch colonial officials in general had a negative impact on the formation of an indigenous business elite in Java. These two Australian scholars argue that state intervention in the rural economy of Java restricted capital accumulation and made money-lending a more lucrative investment than commercial agriculture, small industry or trade. The attempt by the colonial state to reconstruct the traditional village, which had supposedly never existed in such a form, forced the Javanese into the lowest level of the colonial economy, stripping them of the economic autonomy that efficient participation required.
The political economy of the Dutch colonial state was designed by a group of economic theorists, of whom J.H. Boeke was the most important. In developing a theory of social and economic needs, Boeke stressed that the natives of the Dutch colony had different needs to the Westerners. Whereas the economic behaviour of the latter was guided by economic incentives and profit maximization, the indigenous economy was thought to be based primarily on social needs. The Javanese peasant and trader consequently 'placed a very high value on leisure and social obligations and preferred to share resources rather than compete for them' (Alexander and Alexander 1991a:370) . Contemporary commentaries considered native trade of 'little significance and [it] scarcely merits the title of commerce' (Alexander and Alexander 1991b:70) . This is, as Alexander and Alexander point out, a matter of perspective. Indigenous trade did not benefit the colonial state treasury and it was therefore deemed insignificant. This ideological bias led the colonial state to 'protect' the Javanese from the detrimental effects of capitalism and to devise welfare rather than development programmes.
Javanese merchant-entrepreneurs faced another major obstacle in the competition they had to face from Chinese businesses. This competition intensified in the early twentieth century, when the local economies in the Indies Archipelago were increasingly integrated into the world economy and large numbers of Chinese immigrants entered the Dutch colony. Production and consumption then became much more dependent upon supply and demand from outside the regional sphere, while through their wide intraregional dialect networks, the singkeh (new immigrants) were better equipped to deal with this expanding market than the localized indigenous merchant groups. Indigenous capitalist groups in Java therefore had a hard time maturing within the Dutch colonial economy.
In the regions outside Java it was quite a different story. By the late nineteenth century wealthy Acehnese and Malay business families controlled the direct import of textiles from Penang to Aceh and East Sumatra. These merchants travelled to Penang to buy British, German, and Swiss textiles, which were shipped and distributed through their own channels. The commercial shrewdness of the Buginese and Makassarese seafaring traders is well known, although still not well documented. In West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Celebes, and the rubber-producing areas of East Borneo, indigenous entrepreneurs continued to hold important stakes in the regional economy. Colonial bureaucratic control was far less effective in these areas. The government in Batavia was mainly concerned with creating a suitable business environment for Western capital. Effective governmental control was lacking in large parts of the Outer Provinces, and economic developments offered opportunities to entrepreneurs from all ethnic groups. It is striking that H. Fievez de Malines van Ginkel in his 1926 report on the indigenous economy, is fairly enthusiastic about the capitalist zeal and business success of indigenous entrepreneurs in Sumatra, East Kalimantan, and other areas (Fievez de Malines van Ginkel 1926,11:169-97) . A free interplay between Chinese, Dutch, and indigenous merchant activity was possible throughout the greater part of the Outer Regions even up to the outbreak of the Pacific War. In Palembang the production of and trade in coffee and rubber was dominated by indigenous merchants. In 1925 there were about ninety large, indigenous merchant houses in that city. In Bengkulu, where coffee was the main cash crop, the local trade and export to Batavia was also controlled by Palembang traders. Coffee was transported in small trucks, carts, sailing boats and prahu. The passenger cars and trucks in the region were owned mainly by indigenous people. In Jambi there were some large indigenous wholesalers who exported rubber and rattan direct to Singapore. In the province of the West Coast of Sumatra several Malayan wholesalers at Padang and Fort de Kock traded direct with business partners at Singapore. In all these regions local trade and the collection of local produce was controlled to a large extent by indigenous business families. In Sumatra the indigenous entrepreneur seemingly had far more 'economic autonomy' than his counterpart in Java.
Despite their local and intralocal importance, the Sumatran merchants had very little access to the intra-Asian economy. Their only outside links were with Batavia, Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Penang. Chinese dominance of intra-Asian trading networks, and to a lesser extent the competition from Indian and Arab merchants, prevented their spreading their wings and hence their development into major business cartels. When by the late twenties the Japanese were looking for new business partners in the Archipelago and the 'nationalist' movement was gaining successes over the establishment of indigenous business cooperations, the Sumatrans eagerly took advantage of the opportunities offered.
Characteristics of Japanese inroads into the Indies economy
The economic involvement of Japan in Southeast Asia started at the end of the nineteenth century with the arrival of marginal social elements from the southwestern part of Japan: adventurers, itinerant traders, shopkeepers, and, above all, prostitutes. 4 In 1899 the Japanese migrants were given European status, allowing them to travel around freely and to establish enterprises in all areas which seemed to offer economic potential. Japan's trade with the Indies was carried out mainly by Overseas Chinese networks. Coal, matches, medicines, earthenware, hairpins, and yarn were among the major export items to the Indies, while Java sugar was sold in huge quantities to Japan. Several Japanese trading firms had established branches here as early as 1905 and were regularly sending agents all over the Archipelago. After the foundation of the Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1912, these agents and small shopkeepers were approached by local SI leaders anxious to bypass Chinese networks. The data on these early links are very scarce, but certainly in some areas in Central and East Java genuine and successful attempts were made in this direction.
The SI at Muntilan (Kedu, Central Java) acquired weaving looms from Japan through the mediation of a pharmaceutical trader, K. Tomimasu, in Yogyakarta. The same source mentions that indigenous weaving mills in the area had worked for years with Japanese looms. Haji Edris, desa head of Getaksantren and chairman of the SI in Muntilan, owned a lurik weaving mill with eight hand looms which he had bought from a Japanese merchant in Magelang (Post 1991:181-2) . In 1915, in the wake of the Twenty-One Demands, when anti-Japanese boycotts by the Chinese affected the sale of their products, prominent Japanese shop owners in Java wrote an angry letter to the Japanese consul-general and threatened 4 In the past decade much work has been done on the pre-war economic expansion of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. See among others Shimizu 1988 Shimizu , 1991 Dick 1989; Post 1993a Post , 1993b to 'incite' the Sarekat Islam against the Chinese if the Dutch colonial government did not intervene. Although it is doubtful if they would have had the power to carry out their threat, it shows that even at this early stage Japanese merchants viewed the Islamic business community as a strategic instrument in attacking Chinese control of intermediate trading networks in the Indies.
During and after World War I Japan greatly extended its economic networks in the region, bringing them into closer contact with the local population and indigenous entrepreneurs. Rather than establishing themselves in the major towns of the Archipelago, as most Western merchant houses did, Japanese businessmen moved into the district centres and Javanese rural areas. 5 The bank crisis of 1927 in Japan, which led to massive unemployment and local poverty, forced many young rural Japanese to seek their fortunes further afield. The Indies Archipelago was one of the areas to which they migrated, and between 1927 and 1930 the Japanese male population in the Dutch colony more than doubled, namely from 2,061 to 4,598 (Swan 1988:108-10) . Most of these migrants engaged in retail trade and set up shops {toko Jepang). Occasionally they also bought up local produce. In roughly the same period large Japanese trading companies and the zaibatsu established their own distributive outlets in the interior of Java. The Japanese set their sights on the Indies as one of the major targets for their textile trade, which had suffered on the Chinese market (Sugiyama 1994:40-1) . This local penetration of Japanese businesses enabled them to acquire a thorough knowledge of rural credit networks and local demand, while at the personal level it fostered intimate personal contacts, which sometimes led to close business cooperation.
In 1927 the Menadonese G.B. Kullit, in collaboration with the Japanese S. Nawata, established the Trade Exchange Bureau at Kobe. Their small office provided information about Japan's trade with Indonesia and India. Besides doing translation work for Japanese and Indonesian businessmen, the Trade Exchange Bureau issued a fortnightly paper, the Warta Dagang (Trade Report), which soon had more than 3000 readers in the Indies and some 500 subscribers in Japan. Publication costs were covered by some large Japanese companies and the Nanyo Kyokai (South Seas Association). 6 The magazine maintained close connections with the Japanese- 5 On the divergent market strategies employed by large Japanese and Dutch merchant houses see Post 1994. 6 Gustaaf Berendhard Kullit was born in 1900 at Kansar, Tonsea (Minahasa). After being involved in a shipwreck he found himself in Japan at the age of fourteen. At first he lived in Osaka and Tokyo, but by the end of 1919 he had moved to Kobe, where he became a Malay language teacher at the School for Foreign Languages at Osaka and the Nautical College at Kobe. During the late twenties he worked as an agent for the Japanese lumber traders Itonaga at Posso (Menado). In 1933 he entered the service of the Deli-Atjeh Handelmaatschappij for a short period. Soon he established his own small trading firm. In May 1934 Kullit's younger brother moved
Malay newspaper Bendee, published in Surakarta, which was owned by Ricahiro Ogawa, one of the most prominent Japanese merchants in Central Java. The Arab owner of the Rasjid Kanaekan trading company at Sibolga (Tapanuli, Sumatra) in 1928 went to Tokyo with a view to importing Japanese goods direct. Around the same time the Sumatran trader Ismael bin Haji Masir from Deli established a branch of his import firm in Yokohama and started selling Japanese products direct to indigenous merchants in Java. Indian businesses like Danamal, Wasiamull, and Chotirmall, which had been well established in the Asian textile trade for decades and which operated several branches in Sumatra and West Java, also became increasingly involved in the Japanese textile trade with South and Southeast Asia (Brown 1994:189-212) . By the late twenties indigenous, Arab, and Indian business families all over the Archipelago were showing an increasing interest in developing commercial contacts with Japan and, more importantly, were actually doing so. The Arab and Indian business groups, which belonged to extended merchant networks stretching from India and Singapore to Thailand and China, were of course in a better position to do so. Indigenous business families in Sumatra which lacked these contacts with intra-Asian networks waited for an opportunity to establish contacts with outside allies.
Indigenous business elites and their Japanese connections 1
According to Robison (1986:50-4) and P.T. Data Consult (1992), the following indigenous entrepreneurs were the most prominent during the 'Benteng Period ', 1950-1959 These businessmen were important financiers of the Soekarno regime. This first generation of entrepreneurs -those born before the First World Warparticularly the Sumatrans, had been sympathetic to the various nationalist movements. With the exception of Haji Shamsoedin, who was a member of the Islamic Masyumi, most of them belonged to the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and its successors. One of the most influential entrepreneurs under the Soekarno regime was Agoes Moesin Dasaad. By the mid-fifties the Dasaad family ranked fifth among the wealthiest families in Indonesia. 9 An economic animal and a non-political opportunist, Dasaad enjoyed a career that was to a large extent typical of the Sumatran traders. With him material gain took precedence over political loyalties. As in the case of his famous Chinese contemporary Oei Tjong Hauw, the president of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern in the thirties and forties, Dasaad's fortune depended on his ability to establish profitable personal relations with powerful political figures. He succeeded quite well during the period under discussion in this essay, but once Suharto took over, the Dasaad-Musin Concern soon became history, leaving only an impressive office complex in Jakarta Kota, which it had occupied already during the Japanese occupation.
11 Nitisemito founded a kretek company in 1910 and opened a large factory at Kudus in 1934. In that year he reportedly employed over 10,000 workers and produced 8 million clove-scented cigarettes daily. He acquired the nickname 'Kretek King', but his fortunes rapidly declined at the end of the Dutch period, after receiving a claim for several hundred thousand guilders in back taxes. See Sutter 1959,1:48-9. 9 Interview with Emilia Moesin, niece of A.M. Dasaad, Jakarta.
Agoes Moesin Dasaad and the Sumatran business families
Dasaad's father was a guru agama (religious teacher) from the Islamic Sulu Archipelago (South Philippines), where Dasaad was born at Jolo on 25 August, 1905. 10 When he was one year old, his father and mother (who was from one of the royal lineages in Sulu) migrated to Indonesia and settled in the Lampung district in South Sumatra. Indigenous agriculture in Lampung was based on rice and cash crops like pepper and coconuts. European estates produced mainly coffee, rubber, and hemp. Pepper was far and away the main export product and local trade was controlled by wealthy indigenous business families. These merchants were often very well-to-do and Pakuan Ratu was known as an important centre of local merchant activity in which Chinese traders were unable to gain a foothold.
After finishing primary school in 1918, Dasaad went to a school for commerce in Singapore, where he studied until 1922. He then took one year's service as an assistant bookkeeper in the Loa Mock & Coy printing works. From 1924 until 1934 he was associated with the Anglo-Egyptian Trading Co., probably located in Palembang. He bought up indigenous produce in Lampung and transported it to Palembang for export to Java, Singapore, and the Philippines. In the mid-twenties Palembang was an important centre of indigenous business. Coffee from Bengkulu, rubber, rattan, and copra from Jambi, and pepper from the Lampung districts were all collected by local indigenous traders, transported to native wholesalers in Palembang and thence exported by indigenous export houses to Singapore and Batavia. By 1926 Dasaad had risen to be one of the directors of the Soerabajase Sigarettenfabriek (Surabaya Cigarette Factory), which was a subsidiary of the British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd. The story is not all absolutely clear on this point, and other sources claim that he was working for a Chinese cigarette merchant, Tio Swie Liang, in Surabaya and was dismissed for embezzlement. By his mid-twenties Dasaad had already seen much of Southeast Asia and was well acquainted with local conditions. This was typical of most of the Sumatran traders. For instance, Haji Shamsoedin, who became the owner of one the largest textile factories in Java, left Palembang in 1917 at the age of fifteen and moved to Java. In Kediri he saw machine-powered weaving looms for the first time, which made an enormous impression on him. In 1926, when he was given the opportunity to buy a small factory in Cirebon, he did not hesitate to do so." Djohan Soetan Soelaiman, to take another example, went to Batavia in 1921 at the age of twenty-five, to start buying goods for Djohan & 10 The information on Dasaad is taken from several extensive Dutch reports written during and immediately after the Japanese occupation. ARA, Algemene Secretarie, 1942 Secretarie, -1950 Secretarie, , nr. 2586 Aziz 1972:19-24) .
At this point it is important to note that these Sumatran trading groups did not operate locally. It is even doubtful whether they earned their original capital by dealing only in local produce. From the information I have gathered, I have gained the strong impression that, although these entrepreneurs used their native places as sources af products and export markets, their main businesses were centred on and run in Batavia. So, instead of developing from local trading groups into interisland and international trading firms, as for example Robison (1986:52) states, the Sumatran businessmen who are the subject of this essay started out as interisland traders and wholesale merchants using, among other things, their extensive kinship ties for their trading networks.
By the mid-twenties, Javanese intellectuals under the leadership of Soetomo were exerting increasing pressure on the Dutch colonial government to actively support and thereby stimulate indigenous membership of the capitalist top layer of the colonial economy. On the initiative of Soetomo's Indonesische Studieclub a weaving school, a meat cooperative, a handicraft centre, trade unions, and the NV Bank Nasional Indonesia (1929) were set up (Sutter 1959,1:122) . Following the 1927 government ordinance on indigenous cooperatives, the position of Indonesians in commerce showed some improvement, but in general the colonial 'welfare' policy set legal limitations on the acquisition of capital and greatly hindered the aspirations of middle-class would-be businessmen (Liem 1947:75-81; Sutter 1959,1:102-4) . The Indonesische Studieclub set up a central purchasing organization, the Persatoean Koperasi Indonesia, and in December 1931 the Kongres Koperasi Indonesia decided that it would establish direct links with Japanese business houses and manufacturers in order to eliminate 'foreign' (that is, Chinese) control of intermediate trade and distribution networks.
Eager to seize every opportunity, Dasaad entered the commerce between Indonesia and Japan in the wake of this decision. He combined forces with Djohan Soetan Soelaiman, Djohor Soetan Perpatih, Ajoeb Rais, and Abdul Ghany Aziz to break the Chinese monopoly on the import of textiles from Japan. This move coincided with the Manchurian Crisis, when anti-Japanese boycotts by Chinese merchants forced Japanese exporters to seek new partners. The devaluation of the yen in December 1931 facilitated the direct purchase of Japanese goods by indigenous entrepreneurs. The Sumatran traders called in the help of Djohan and Djohor's nephew, Mohammed Hatta. In April 1933 Hatta went on a tour of Japan, where he stayed until August. Hatta's trip to Japan had been viewed mostly from a political point of view, and this idea was fed by an article in a Japanese daily, the Osaka Mainichi, calling Hatta the 'Gandhi of Java', and by articles in Dutch newspapers and weeklies in colonial Indonesia. In Chinese business circles, Hatta's political motives received scant attention. To them he was 'The Merchant of Padang', a tool in the hands of the business cliques of Minangkabau and Palembang. 13 One of the purposes of his trip was to establish contacts with Japanese textile manufacturers who were willing to export direct to the Sumatran traders (Goto 1986:352-6; Post 1993a ). Hatta's party included Ajoeb Rais, managing clerk and business partner of Djohan & Djohor.
Rais can be considered to be the godfather of modern pribumi enterprise in Indonesia.
14 He was born in Kroi (South Sumatra) at the end of the nineteenth century (probably around 1895) and learned his trading skills as a sales clerk at Reiss & Co. at Medan. After a few years he felt he was being discriminated against by his Dutch superiors and colleagues and decided to start his own business. In his early twenties Rais moved to Batavia, where he fell under the spell of Japan's industrial power. His house became a meeting place for aspiring pribumi entrepreneurs. Like Abdul Ghany Aziz, Rais had a strong desire to establish an independent Indonesian class of merchants, which would have its own direct links with foreign markets and its own production centres. Dasaad, who was of a younger generation, became a regular visitor to the Rais residence, while the latter was to become Dasaad's business advisor.
On his trip to Japan Hatta was also accompanied by two Japanese, Ando Sadaichi, manager of the Batavia branch of the Nanyo Sei-ei Shokai at Nishinomiya, and Itogawa Seishichi, owner of a wholesale trading firm in Palembang. 15 and was one of those Japanese in pre-war Indonesia who greatly inspired pribumi businessmen, never tiring of teaching them the rules of international trade and always ready to assist them with practical advice, business contacts, and sometimes Japanese capital. In May 1933 Djohan & Djohor appointed a purchasing agent in Tokyo. Soon two hundred cases packed with woven sarongs were sent to the Indies and unloaded in Batavia, Surabaya, Semarang, Cirebon, Telok Betung, Palembang, Padang, and Bengkulu. In August that same year, Djohor Soetan Perpatih travelled to Kobe and Osaka to establish branch offices. On this trip Djohor was accompanied by Moeridan, scion of a wealthy batik-manufacturing family in Yogyakarta. 16 Moeridan was in charge of a toko in Yogyakarta which was to become Djohan & Djohor's agency for Central Java. In Yogyakarta he worked in close collaboration with the Toko Jepang Fuji. This warehouse was frequented by members of the Mangkunegoro royal family.
17
These were the years in which Dasaad's commercial network was rapidly expanding. Soon thereafter the whole group of Sumatran traders established purchasing offices for Japanese textiles in Batavia, Semarang, Sukabumi, and Malang. Their interests in Japan were represented by Ando Sadaichi and Noerdin Moeri, a commercial agent from Tapanuli who had been living in Japan for several years.
111 M. Gaoes Mahjoedin, a student in Tokyo, and other Indonesian students in Japan were also engaged in commercial activities (Goto 1986:355) . A 'Sarekat Indonesia' was established in Tokyo in December 1933 to coordinate their respective interests.
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The Sumatran merchants' most influential Japanese relations were Ishihara Shinsaburo and Handa Jisaburo. The former was managing director of the Ishihara Sangyo Kaiun Kaisha (Ishihara Industrial and Shipping Company, ISK), a company that had started iron ore mining in Malaya in 1919 and through this original venture had managed to build up a huge conglomerate of mining, trading, and shipping companies. Handa Jisaburo had reorganized Nanyo Veem, a warehousing company with premises in all the major ports of Southeast Asia. After the ISK entered the Japan-Java shipping route, Nanyo Veem became its agent. Both Ishihara
In 1931 Itogawa's trading firm had ten employees and the company had the sole agency for two large Japanese export firms in Osaka, the Kyodo Boeki and the Nihon Bussan. BUZA, Archive Consulate-General at Kobe, no. M36. 16 Report of Hendrik Mouw, Head of the Office of East-Asian Affairs, on Japanese indigenous cooperation. ARA, Ministerie van Kolonien, vb. 7-9-1935 Goto 1991:26. and Handa were well-known (and in Dutch eyes notorious) Nanshinron advocates. The Batak journalist Parada Harahap, an ardent supporter of the 'nationalist' movement, who went to Japan at the end of 1933, was also welcomed and escorted around by Ishihara Shinsaburo and by agents of the warehousing company Nanyo Veem.
The goods imported by the Sumatran traders were shipped on the ISK lines and Djohan & Djohor obtained credit from the Taiwan Bank. The initiatives taken by these Sumatran business groups brought Japanese industry important new markets. This was one of the main reasons the Nanyo Yusen Kaisha, the largest Japanese shipping company, extended its Java line to Padang in September 1932 and Palembang in May 1933.
The entrance of the Sumatran traders into the intra-Asian commercial arena was quite an astonishing achievement and proved to be a turningpoint in the long-term history of indigenous business activity in the Indies Archipelago. Several officials in the Dutch colonial office in Batavia had an inkling of the significance of this development. And they warned against it. The ensuing Crisis Import Ordinance, which was issued in September 1933, and the subsequent Importers' Licensing of 1935 put the screws on direct imports from Japan by Sumatran business families. Indeed, one of the major objects of the implementation of this was to cut the links between indigenous business houses and large Japanese capitalist enterprises (Post 1991:198-9) . In 1934 Dasaad became director of the Handelmaatschappij Lawsim Zechna Co. Ltd., a Chinese trading company which held the sole agency for Parker propelling pencils. Dutch sources claim that by that time he had already earned his first million. By 1937 new opportunities were beckoning. The outbreak of the war between Japan and China triggered off a rash of anti-Japanese boycotts throughout the region. This was the moment Dasaad and Abdul Ghany Aziz chose to establish the 'Ghandas' commission office in Batavia. 20 Abdul Ghany Aziz was already a wellknown businessman. With very little capital at its disposal, the company soon found itself in hot water, however. Aziz was sued by Behn Meyer Co. Ltd. for corruption and was arrested, tried, and jailed for a few months. 21 When Raden Soedjono was appointed as a teacher in Japan, Dasaad succeeded him as chairman of the Inheemsche Handelsvereeniging (Indigenous Trade Association). That same year he, Ajoeb Rais and Abdul Ghany Aziz founded the Malaya Import Company, which lost no time in establishing a branch office, called the Malaya-Nippon Trading Co. in Japan (Ghany Aziz 1972:32) . The Malaya Import Co. Ltd. was granted credit by the Effendi Bank, a bank set up by Soeleiman Effendi (at 20 The Ghandas firm was regarded by its contemporaries, and by Dutch commentators, as an Indian company. The name 'Ghandas' is an abbrevation of 'GhanyDasaad', however. See Ghany Aziz 1972:38. 21 'Dasaad File'. ARA, Archief van de Procureur Generaal, nr. 350. that time 68 years of age) working with Japanese capital in Surabaya. Effendi, who spoke Japanese, had close contacts with Yoshizumi Tomegoro, both a correspondent of the To-indo Nippo and a businessman.
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Up to this point Rahman Tamin, another famous pre-war Sumatran businessman, had not become affiliated with Dasaad and Rais and their confreres. 23 Although Tamin was friendly with them and knew most of them quite well, thus far he had operated on his own very successfully. With capital from his father, who was a well-respected trader in Minangkabau, Rahman Tamin had set up his own textile shop in Padang in the late twenties. In 1930 he went to Batavia to open the Firma Rahman Tamin and in 1933 he established the Toko Jacatra in Pasar Senen. Not content with a position as intermediary in the retail textile business, Tamin worked hard to gain a foothold in the wholesale business. Determination won the day, and in 1936-37 he was able to open an office and warehouse at Pintu Kecil, the heart of the Chinese textile business in Batavia. This achievement gained him enormous respect in indigenous business circles, and he was drawn into Hatta's orbit. In 1938 Rahman Tamin combined some of his capital with that of Dasaad and together they opened a branch office in Singapore (Mestika Zed 1991:395, note 47). This step marked the beginning of Rahman Tamin's involvement in the Japan-Indonesia trade.
24
In 1941 Dasaad bought the textile factory Kantjil Mas at Bangil (East Java), which had belonged to a German. 25 He ran this factory jointly with Abdul Ghany Aziz, using credit provided by the Javasche Bank. Dasaad's purchase of Kantjil Mas was made possible by Ir. Raden Mas Pandji Soerachman Tjokroadisoerjo, an official in the Department of Economic Affairs, and through his personal links with Mr. G.G. van Buttingha Wichers, president-director of the Javaasche Bank from 1930 to 1941. 26 This same year Rahman Tamin went to Japan on a business trip. He wanted to establish new branches and to see whether it would be possible to 22 On Yoshizumi Tomegoro (1911-48) and his relationship with Nishijima Shigetada, Achmad Subardjo, and others see Nishijima 1986:251-76 . 23 The information in this part is taken mostly from several extensive interviews with Rachmania Tamin Djoemena and Drs. H.A.R. Soerianata Djoemena, daughter and son-in-law respectively of the late Rahman Tamin. 24 Although I have not yet found any concrete evidence, it seems highly likely that Rahman Tamin was asked by Moh. Hatta to affiliate himself with the Dasaad-Rais group at that particular point in time. In the interviews conducted in Jakarta I was increasingly impressed by the central role Hatta played in bringing all these different Sumatran entrepreneurs together in the late thirties and mid-forties. 25 The N.V. Textielfabriek en Handel Maatschappij Kantjil Mas was registered by A. Schonmann on 18 June 1937, and was capitalized at 200,000 guilders (De Bussy 1940 :1056 . 26 Soerachman was one of the few high-ranking Indonesian officials in the Department of Economic Affairs. He worked in the manufacturing section and had conducted extensive research into the Javanese textile industry. See Gunseikanbu 1944:208. purchase weaving looms and other equipment to furnish his and Dasaad's expanding textile business with.
On the eve of the Japanese invasion of British Malaya the foremost indigenous entrepreneurs of the Netherlands East Indies had successfully combined forces and were holding their own in the intra-Asian commercial arena. Their international businesses, preponderantly in textiles, centred on Japanese capital and industry. They were emerging as major entrepreneurial groups which were able to compete, albeit on a minor scale, with Dutch and Chinese business interests.
The effects of the Japanese occupation on pribumi business formation
When the Japanese military took over Dutch economic institutions and companies, many aspiring Indonesian businessmen were able to move into positions which had formerly been closed to them (see Sutter 1959,1:135-6, 173-6) . Younger indigenous entrepreneurs -of whom many came from Sumatra, like T.D. Pardede, Achmad Bakrie, B.R. Motik, and Harlan Bektiwere able to capitalize on the Japanese occupation period. T.D. Pardede, for example, left his job at a Dutch plantation in 1942 and began his own trading business: collecting sugar and salt in Sibolga and other places in North Tapanuli, then selling these goods in Siantar and Medan. He owned his own truck, and within three years became one of the richest people in Tapanuli (Bangun 1987:186-7) .
27 Pre-war peranakan Chinese firms found themselves in disarray. Once affiliated with large Dutch trading firms and banking institutions and now deprived of this support, these companies were soon to lose their grip on the Indonesian economy (Twang Peck Yang 1987) . The economic environment during the Japanese occupation proved inimical to the sorts of business practices which flourished in peace time (Twang Peck Yang 1987:52) .
The zaibatsu seized control of the foreign trade of the Indies as well as the interinsular trade between Java, Borneo, and Celebes. Japanese business in general occupied those economic sectors which were thought to be indispensable to the Japanese war effort, for example oil, coal, copra, tin, bauxite, mangane, and rubber production. The sugar estates, too, were brought under direct Japanese control (Sutter 1959,1:148-9, 219-21) . The remaining sectors of the economy, like food production and manufacturing industries, were left to pribumi, Chinese, Arab, and Indian merchantentrepreneurs.
Although daily necessities like foodstuffs and textiles soon grew scarce in Java, the majority of the pribumi entrepreneurs continued their trading activities and out of sheer necessity moved into fields into which they had not ventured before the war. Haji Abdul Ghany Aziz, in his autobiography, describes the Japanese occupation as an extremely gloomy period in which many people suffered. Referring to himself, he writes that, despite the difficult circumstances, he kept on trading and always had sufficient stocks of rice, coffee, tea, and other agricultural produce. In 1943 he established the Masayu Trading Co. in Bandung (Ghany Aziz 1972:41-3) .
By introducing the kumiai (business cooperative initiated to control the production, sale, and prices of all kinds of agricultural produce and manufactured goods), the Japanese authorities did their best to gain control of the local economy with a view to achieving self-sufficiency in most of the Indonesian daerah. The kumiai operated at every level (from the regional shu level to the kabupaten). As the Japanese had granted the different ethnic groups the same legal and political rights, members of each of these groups were appointed to the boards of different kumiai. Actually, in certain kumiai the position of manager was reserved for Indonesians, while membership had to be divided equally between Indonesians and Chinese (Twang Peck Yang 1987:58) . On 3 April 1942, the Persatoean Waroeng Bangsa Indonesia (Perwabi, Union of Indonesian Retailers) was set up. The man in charge was B.R. Motik, a thirty-year-old merchant from Palembang (Sutter 1959,1:145; Bangun 1987:vi) . Although Perwabi was founded as a competitor to the Chinese association of shopkeepers, it failed in its attempt to obtain goods for sale from the Japanese authorities. Rather than having a variety of different ethnic associations, the Japanese preferred Chinese and Indonesian businessmen to work together. The kumiai were organized in such a way that each member would bring in capital on a share-holding basis. There was a limit to the number of shares members could own, and the price of each share was kept low in order to ensure that Indonesians could play an adequate role in the cooperative (Twang Peck Yang 1987:58) . It is indisputable that the controlled economy the Japanese tried to establish greatly benefited Indonesian participation in commerce. In Jakarta, the cloth that was available was distributed partly through the Poesat Pembelian Gaboengan Perniagaan Indonesia (PPGPI, Purchasing Centre of the Indonesian Trade Association) and could be obtained from the twenty-eight Indonesian shops united in the PPGPI. Among them were Djohan Djohor in Pasar Senen and Rahman Tamin in Pintu Kecil. In April 1943, Rahman Tamin opened another branch for the sale of cloth and other goods in Pasar Baru (Asia Raya, 27 March 1943 ,5 April 1943 .» 28 The firm of Alsaid bin Awad Martak was the largest non-European textile company in Java. Originally a construction firm in Surabaya, the company established a textile mill in that city in 1934 on the advice of Ir. Darmawan Mangoenkoesoemo, who was government industrial adviser there. The following year, the brothers Faradj and Achmad Said Martak, of the Arab firm founded an even larger weaving mill at Kesono, near Mojokerto, which operated 1000 looms (600 of them mechanized) under a Dutch plant manager. All of these mechanized looms, called the Suzuki Agoes Moesin Dasaad was one indigenous businessmen who was able to expand his operations considerably during the Japanese occupation. He was one of the favourites of the Japanese authorities and had close connections with high-ranking Kempetai officials. Through his chief of sales, a fellow Lampongese, R.D. Goestam, Dasaad built up an extensive network within the Japanese (military) bureaucracy. Goestam was a brother-in-law of Pangeran Ratoemega, who had a business partnership with T. Mori, a Kempetai agent, under the name Perseroean Dagang MoriMega.
In June 1942 the Japanese established the Kigyo Tosei Kai (Textile Control Board) which supervised the purchase, sale, and storage of yarn for weaving throughout the whole of East Java. As one of the heads of a leading textile enterprise in the region, Dasaad was appointed to a seat on the managerial board. The other directors were S. Achmad bin Said Awad Martak, of the firm of Alsaid bin Awad Martak, M. Surtel (a Dutchman), 'plant manager' of the Martak weaving mill at Kesono, and C. H. Caals, head of the N.V. Java Textiel Industrie in Surabaya. 29 The Textile Control Board decided which weaving mills could remain open and which firms could act as wholesalers.
That same month Dasaad, Rahman Tamin (who had just returned from Tokyo), and Rais were to raise 25,000 guilders to bring Soekarno from Padang to Java. When the Persatoean Perniagaan Indonesia (Indonesian Trade Association) was reorganized under its chairman Mesdani and secretary Z. Aziz in September 1942, Dasaad joined J. Salim, Djohor, Soetomo, and Soedarsono as its advisors (Asia Raya, 11 September 1942) .
Two months later he opened the central office of Kantjil Mas in Jakarta Kota. The official opening was attended by Hatta, Soekarno, Ir. Soerachman, H. Dahlan Abdoellah, Mr. Samsoeddin, and other prominent Indonesian political and business leaders (Asia Raya, 20 October 1942) .
Dasaad also became involved with the theatrical troupe Warnasari, which served as a vehicle for Japanese propaganda as part of the Perserikatan Oemoem Sandiwara Djawa. The day-to-day production of sandiwara was in the hands of Goestam, while Dasaad pulled the strings behind the scenes. Warnasari was also engaged in the provision of Javanese and Dutch women for the Japanese military. Dutch sources saw the whole undertaking as nothing more than a cover-up for activities connected with prostitution.
looms, came from Japan. See Sutter 1956,1:43; Harahap 1952:191-4 . After the war Darmawan served on the board of directors of N.V. Handel Mij. Antara-Asia, a trading company owned by the Martak family, who were close business associates of Dasaad. The N.V. Textiel Industrie Java was established with a capital of only 30,000 guilders in July 1937. De Bussy 1940 :1053 I am deeply indebted to Thung Ju Lan (LIP1), currently a PhD graduate at Melbourne University, for thoroughly scrutinizing Asia Raya for news of local business developments.
By mid-1943 the tide of war had turned significantly against Japan, and the military authorities in Java were ordered by Imperial Headquarters to create local defence forces and initiate programmes for winning massive popular support. The Japanese authorities set up advisory boards to promote Indonesian political participation. Among the topics which unavoidably came up for discussion here were economic issues, so that businessmen like Dasaad were also appointed to these boards. The Chuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council) became the key institution for political participation and economic matters. Its membership, comprising men with economic experience, fluctuated at around thirteen (Sutter 1959,I:180-2) . 30 In September 1943, Dasaad was made a member of the Sangikai (Advisory Council) in Batavia, and within a month he became vice-chairman of the Board. His friend and business associate Ir. R.M. Soerachman was appointed to an executive position in the Sangyo Bu, the key economic department.
The military administration in Java announced its plans for a new economic order in April 1944. 31 Western liberalism was regarded as essentially wrong, because liberty and the pursuit of individual profit conflicted with equality and fraternity and had borne the bitter fruit of Asian exploitation by Western colonial powers. Rejecting the West, it decreed that the economic order in Indonesia should be based upon a socalled 'Oriental Morality', of which loyalty, cooperation, and public service comprised the essential elements (Sato 1994:14-7) . By that time most pribumi entrepreneurs were convinced that the Japanese administration would not deliver the economic opportunities which they sought. But they also shared a common feeling that the pre-war colonial economic system, in which the Dutch and Chinese ruled the roost, should not be allowed to return. Towards this end they were prepared to 'play along' with the Japanese as long as this was necessary (Ghany Aziz 1972:43-4) . By the autumn of 1944 the writing was on the wall and it became clear to many that the Japanese occupation would not last much longer.
Dasaad, Haji Abdul Ghany Aziz and A. Bakrie were among the members of an Investigative Committee for the People's Economy set up on 25 April 1945. This forum was dominated by Indonesians but included Chinese, Arab, and Japanese businessmen as well. Making the most of their opportunities, the Indonesians stepped up their business activities, and associations of Indonesian manufacturers were established. As there were signs that independence was a realizable possibility in the short term, indigenous businessmen were buoyed up by the belief that their efforts and labour would contribute to the future economy of a free Indonesia. In the 30 On the structure and workings of the Central Advisory Board, see Sato 1994:64-71 . 31 There five measures were designed to increase Indonesian participation in the Javanese economy. See Sutter 1956, 1:200-11. spirit of the times, Masyumi-oriented businessmen had formed the Soesoenan Ekonomi Bangsa Indonesia Islam (Islamic Indonesian Economic Organization) in January 1945.
Dasaad met several other leading business and political figures in Bandung in June to discuss the necessity of establishing a Java-wide Indonesian business organization. This meeting gave rise to the major business event of the year: the Permoesjawaratan Kaoem Ekonomi Indonesia Seloeroeh Jawa (All-Java Conference of Indonesian Businessmen). This conference was held in Bandung from 20 to 24 July 1945. There were many speakers here (Soekarno, Raden Soejoed, and Soenario, for instance), but the principal speaker was Hatta, who called for a socialisttype of economy based on the spirit of gotong royong. All the businessmen present were conscious of an atmosphere of unity, service, and brotherhood. One of the resolutions passed at the conference led to the setting up of the Persatoean Tenaga Ekonomi Bangsa Indonesia (PTEBI, Union of Indonesian Businessmen). The members of its board included major Indonesian businessmen like Haji Abdul Ghany Aziz and B.R. Motik. On 1 August 1945, the PTEBI opened its office under the name Poesat Tenaga Ekonomi (PTE, Economic Centre) (Twang Peck Yang 1987:98-9) . It seems that this was the first major Indonesian business association for the whole of Java.
By the end of the Japanese occupation, Agoes Moesin Dasaad had amassed a substantial fortune. In September 1945 he donated 100,000 guilders to Soekarno, and with this gesture turned his attention to the creation of the Indonesian Republic, which, he anticipated, would increase his fortune.
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Concluding remarks
In this article I have tried to show that the formation of the pribumi business elite during the 1930s-1940s was related to Japanese infiltration of the pre-war and the wartime economy of Indonesia. In the thirties, Minangkabau and Palembang business families were able to take partalbeit on a minor scale compared with Dutch, Chinese, Arab, and Indian merchant houses -in Japan's trade with the Dutch colony. As in the case of Taiwanese merchants, it was through their Japanese 'connection' that they acquired knowledge and skills in direct foreign trade. Japanese economic policy during the occupation favoured Indonesian participation in the economy. Moreover, rather than building an economy based upon racial-ethnic division (as the Dutch had done), Japanese economic advisors tried to establish a controlled economy which integrated, rather than 32 Just prior to the Japanese surrender, Dasaad and the Gunseikan came to an agreement regarding the total assets of the Kantor Tjitak Damai. He thereupon became the owner of several printing presses and a considerable quantity of printing paper from the Japanese Navy. divided, the different ethnic business groups. Try as they might, the Japanese economic planners were unable to overcome the existing antagonism towards Chinese dominance of most of the economic sectors. This inherent 'dynamic' in Indonesian society proved resistant to the attempts to streamline the economy, despite the fact that in several cases an 'Ali Baba' type of business cooperation, which was to continue in the next decades, took shape between Chinese businessmen and indigenous political (and military) leaders during the revolutionary period.
This essay raises more questions than it answers. Specific examples which spring to mind are the nature of the terms upon which credit was granted by the Japanese to indigenous business. The failure of indigenous merchants to obtain terms of trade that were customary among Europeans or between Europeans and Chinese prevented them from taking part in the wider colonial economy (Alexander and Alexander 1991a:388-9) . It seems that in the pre-war period Japanese business houses offered more favourable credit terms to Sumatran merchant families than to either European or Chinese businesses. This may be connected with the fact that dealing in Japanese goods required less trading capital than dealing in European goods. Both factors facilitated their active participation in the pre-war intra-Asian economy.
If we take a long-term view of the formation of pribumi business elites and the 'rise of capital' in Indonesia, therefore, it will be clear that, despite the political, military, and economic upheavals, Japan played a significant role in this process from the late twenties onward.
